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Only  two  days  after my  arrival in Washington  I  am  grate-
ful  for  this  chance of  addressing  such  a  distinguished American 
audience.  I  come  in fulfilment  of  an  ancient Chinese  curse~"may 
you  live in interesting times".  The  times  are interesting.  The 
times  are  also hard.  Particularly for  trade relations between 
Europe  and  the  United States.  A  variety of metaphors  have  been 
used  over  the last few  weeks  to describe  the state of  these rela-
tions.  I  shall abstain today  from  adding  any  more.  But  what  is 
clear is that relations across  the Atlantic are going  through the 
roughest patch in living memory.  So  let me  take  a  few minutes  of 
your  time  today  and  look,  as  a  European,  at the nature  and  the  scale 
of  these  differences  and  try to put  them in  some  general context. 
These differences  need  in fact  to  be  seen against  a  very 
wide  backcloth,  partly political, partly economic. 
Relations with  the Soviet  Union,  the stability of  the 
Middle  East,  our relations with  the developing countries,  macro-
economic  questions  such  as  the  level of  interest rates,  are only  some 
examples. 
And,  in the mind  of  European  governments,  the  dramatic  and 
rising  level of  unemployment  - the worst  since the  1930s  - is a 
constant and major preoccupation. 
But,  in the interest ofbrevity,  and  since the  Commission of  the European  Communities  has  a  particular interest in trade 
since it represents  in this area its Member  States in dealings 
with other countries,  I  propose  to concentrate on  three subjects 
of dispute: 
- steel 
- pipeline 
- agriculture 
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Many  of  you~particularly from  the U.S.  steel industry-
might  think the steel issue an  open-and-shut case.  Here  is the 
United States steel industry going  through  one  of  the worst periods 
in its history.  Here  are these cunning  foreigners  subsidizing their 
steel exports  to  the  United States  and  dumping  left and  right.  What 
then  have  Europeans  got  to complain about if action in accordance 
with  the  due  process of  U.S.  law is taken  to  stop  these illegal and 
damaging  acts'? 
Let  me  make  three basic points.  And  let me  begin with 
subsidies.  In  1977 we- the  U.S.,  the E.E.C.  and others- agreed 
in what  was  called the  OECD  Consensus  that we  should  cooperate in a 
multilateral  framework  and  that the burden of restructuring steel on 
both  sides of  the Atlantic  should  not be  shifted onto others.  We  both 
had  problems  - out of date  planffi~ inadequate  investment  and  high  labour 
costs.  But  we  agreed  not to try and  export problems  on  one  side of 
the Atlantic to the other. 
We  in the  Community  think that we  have  kept our  side of  the 
bargain.  Over  the  last six years  the work  force  in the  Community 3 
steel industry has  been  reduced  by one-third  - by  some  230,000  jobs. 
And  under  a  Commission decision of August  1981  Member  State aids  to 
the steel sector are strictly prohibited unless  they are geared to 
a  reduction in capacity;  no,  repeat no,  aids will be permitted after 
1985.  These  decisions  were  not easy.  But  they  were  taken  and will 
be  carried through. 
The  second point relates  to the determination of  anti-dumping 
and  subsidies.  How  are these  calculated?  We  contest here  a  whole 
number  of points.  Let  me  give  simply  two  examples.  In the  case  of 
anti-dumping,  a  notional  - some  may  say mythical  - profit margin  of  8 
percent is automatically  included in the  U.S.  calculations.  If any 
of  you  are  earning  8  percent on  your  capital in these  hard  times  you 
can  count yourself  lucky.  And  any  loan to a  so-called  uncreditworthy 
company  is counted  a  subsidy.  Some  of  you  are  in the pension fund 
business.  So  some  of  you  have  shares  in U.S.  Steel.  What  matters  in 
the  long haul is the  long  term outlook,  not an arbitrary automatic 
rule at any  point in time.  So  we  are  contesting these  interpretations 
in the  GATT.  And it is worth recalling that if we  win  our  case,  say 
on  subsidies,  the  GATT  rules provide that counter measures  against the 
United States  could be authorised. 
And  this  leads  to  a  general point.  Not  everything  in the 
GATT  is agreed  down  to  the last comma.  It simply was  not  possible to 
negotiate as  far.  So  it is not  a  good  thing in the mutual interest 
for  partners who  have  to trade with each other to make  unilateral in-
terpretations of  grey areas  in the  GATT  rules. -----------------------------------------------------------
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A third point is that finding imports are subsidized - or dumped  -
is not  enough.  There is nothing in the  international trade rules 
against these practices as  such.  A  British business  friend of mine 
was  once  asked if he  was  dumping  overseas.  He  became  indignant. 
He  was  not  dumping,  he  said.  He  was  exporting at a  loss  in the 
national interest.  What  the  GATT  rules provide is that action can 
be  taken against subsidized or  dumped  imports if they  cause  injury. 
And  this  judgement  has  to be  internationally acceptable.  Now  the 
difficulties of  the  United States steel industry are well  known. 
They  are not,  as  I  indicated earlier,  unique  to the  United States. 
But  we  do  not  think that imports  of  Community  steel amounting  in 
the years  1979  - 1981  to  just over  5%  of  the  United States market 
can  reasonably  be  held  to be  a  significant reason for  the admittedly 
very  serious  problems  of  the  U.S.  industry  - not unlike  those  faced 
by  our  own  industry. 
This  formed  some  of  the  background  to  the  long  and difficult 
discussions  in which  we  agreed with  the  U.S.  Administration  on August  6 
ona  limitation of  Community  steel exports incertain categories which 
would  in return have  provided for  the withdrawal  of countervailing  and 
anti-dumping  suits by  U.S.  industry.  We  were  frankly disappointed 
that the  United States steel industry does  not  seem  to find  these 
proposals attractive.  The  agreement  would  provide for  peace  in the 
valley for  the  next three years  and  would  do  a  lot to stabilise 
confidence  in investment.  If the  agreement is not  implemented,  a 
substantial part of  the  five million tonnes  imported on  average  over 
the last three years  from  the  Community will be at stake,  and if 
European  industry,  which  has  lost a  third of its work  force  and is 
going  through its most difficult time  since the War,  has  to face the prospect of  losing  a  substantial part of its exports  to the 
United States,  then clearly a  very  serious situation would arise. 
Then  the pipeline.  A  lot has  been written about this. 
5 
Some  of  our  views  have  come  across.  I  hope  as  in the case of  steel 
that we  can explore the possibilities of  a  solution.  And  we  welcome 
some  encouraging  signs  in this direction.  But  in default of  a  solu-
tion  - and  since the  argument  in the press  is still going  on,  let me 
try and  summarize  as  reasonably and  as  clearly as  I  can  the  European 
view. 
And  since in this country  one  can have  a  rational dialogue, 
let me  begin  by  asking  a  few questions. 
My  first question is whether it is really thought here that 
the decision of  the'Department of  Commerce  on  22  June  to prohibit 
export of  goods  and  technology  on oil and  gas  is compatible with in-
ternational  law.  I  know  that the niceties of  international  law  do 
not  always  play to  a  full house.  But  the United States have  long  had 
the reputation internationally of being  a  law-abiding country.  And 
being  on  the right side of  the  law not only produces  that inner tran-
quillity which  only  the  good Lord or  a  visit to Abercrombie  and Fitch 
can provide.  It is also good  for  business.  Now  we  think that this 
decision is not  compatible with international  law.  We  take  exception 
in particular to its extra territorial and retroactive nature.  We 
set our detailed views  on  this question  in  a  memorandum  which  we  gave 
to the  Department of  Commerce  in early August.  I  will  spare  you  now 
the details.  But  a  copy  is available here  today  for  anyone  who  would 
like to see  our  argumentation. 6 
My  second question is this.  Supposing  that the situation 
were  reversed.  Let  us  suppose that a  European  Government  or  the 
Community  were  to say  to the  United States: "you  have got your  trading 
relationship with  a  certain major  country  completely wrong.  We 
thoroughly disapprove  of  how  you  are conducting  your  relations.  And 
we  are  therefore ordering all European  firms  which  have  any dealings 
with the  United States over  an  important range  of high  technology to 
cut off  their  supply  of  knowhow  and  goods".  Coming  from  a  country 
which  lost a  lot of  tea in Boston Harbour years  ago,  I  could make 
some  guess at the  reactions.  But it is a  question more  for  you  than 
for me. 
My  next question relates to the export of  high  technology. 
What  do  you  think the results of  this decision will be  on the United 
States exports  in this field of critical and  growi~g importance? 
How  will the  increasing  and very valuable  trend to  joint ventures  be 
affectedi  You  will have  seen  an  estimate  by  the  Department of Commerce 
of  a  cost to u.s.  companies  over  the  next three years  of  up  to 
$600 million in exports  and  an  additional  loss  for  licensees of 
$1.6  billion.  The  United States  Trade  Representative,  Bill 
Brock,  has  asked  that the meeting  of  the  GATT  Ministers planned  for 
November  in Geneva  should  launch  a  study of  international trade  in 
high  technology.  Given  the  growing  importance  this sector will 
assume  over  the next  few  decades,  this move  is understandable.  But 
I  hope  you  will not accuse  me  of  an  excess  of  European  logic if  I 
say  that to have  the right hand put something  on  the table for  exam-
ination while in a  smooth  conjuror-like movement  the  left hand  removes 
it is to say  the  least somewhat  confusing.  And  this is not  of  course 7 
simply  a  question of  the  short term.Foreign buyers will be reluctant 
to sign  up  and  pay  for  transfers of  technology with what  they are 
bound  now  to  consider  an  unreliable partner. 
My  fourth  question relates to exports of grain.  A  question 
was  put  to  a  high  U.S.  official in Brussels at a  press conference 
this  summer  about the  effect on  the  Soviet Union  of  a  limitation of 
U.S.  grain exports.  If this were  to happen,  the questioner asked, 
would  not  the  world price be  bound  to rise with  the result that  a  sum 
not far  removed  from  the  10  billion dollars  from  the pipeline which 
the  Soviets  hope  to get annually in  some  years  time  could  be  extracted 
from  them  tomorrow?  Particularly given the very dominant  position of 
the  U.S.  in world grain trade  and  the very  large Soviet  demand  following 
a  fourth grain  crop  failure.  Of  course1 limiting  U.S.  grain exports 
is  a  difficult proposition.  However,  it is no  easier to tolerate a 
situation where  thousand  of skilled European workers  are  turned out 
on  the  streets  - in a  Community  with  unemployment  already rising towards 
11  million  - on  the  instructions of  a  government  thousands  of miles 
away. 
In fact,  let me  say that we  view this issue,  with due  apologies 
to Charles  Dickens,  as  the Tale of  the  Two  Pipelines.  In pictorial 
form  - I  speak as  an  admirer  of  Herblock  - there would  be  two  pipe-
lines.  One would  begin  in  Iowa  and  end  in Moscow. 
For  the  second pipeline you  have  to go  to a  field  in Western 
Europe  where  a  pipeline half finishes  and half doesn't,  like the  smile 
on  the Cheshire  Cat.  In other words it is still to be built.  And  by ------ --------------------------~----------
it stands  a  huge  placard with the  following  inscription: 
Everyone  knows 
that grain is fungible 
but dealing  in gas 
is for  those 
who  are gullible. 
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There  are  some  additional points.  It is argued that the 
pipeline would  dangerously  increase Western  Europe's  dependence  on 
the  Soviet Union. 
But  even  when  this gas  is  flowing  at  a  maximum  rate in 
1990,  it will represent  less  than  4  percent of  the Community's  total 
energy  consumption.  Would  you  have  us  instead increase our  dependence 
on  such  suppliers as  Iran?  There is not much  evidence that they  would 
be  more  dependable. 
Again it is argued that without the Department  of  Commerce 
decision high  technology would  flow  dangerously  to the Soviet Union. 
But  this decision will give the Soviets  a  strong  inducement to enlarge 
their own  manufacturing capacity and  to accelerate their own  turbine 
and  compressor  developments, thus  becoming  independent of Western  sources. 
Do  you  think  the country which  put the  sputnik into  space is incapable 
of this?  In the meantime  the pipeline  from  Siberia to Western Europe 
will be  built.  The  Soviets will simply divert technology  and  produc-
tion capacity  from other parts of their current prograro. 
Mr.  Ambassador,  if I  have  been  frank  about  our doubts,  it is not 
because  we  wish to carp or criticize for  the  sake  of it.  It is rather 
a  tribute to a  relationship between friends  and allies that we  can both 
afford to lay our  views  on  the  line.  Equally  we  understand that the 9 
decision of  the  U.S.  Administration was  one of principle.  And  views 
of principle held  between  friends  and  allies deserve  a  careful hearing 
and  careful discussion.  But here there was  no  prior discussion.  And 
we  do  honestly  think that the decision has  some  major  drawbacks.  It 
will 
- boost Soviet technology; 
- damage  U.S.  business; 
- damage  European  business; 
- not prevent the pipeline  from  being built; 
- and  not fulfil  a  major  U.S.  aim  - which  could 
be  achieved by  other means  - of  limiting Soviet 
foreign  currency  spending  on  technology  and 
hardware. 
And  the decision has,  as  we  all know,  caused disarray in 
the Western Alliance.  The  Soviets  are  not displeased,  I  believe. 
And it is open  to doubt  how  much  all this will really help the Poles. 
Let me  turn to another crisis area  - agriculture.  Now  here 
we  should  be  clear from  the outset that there can  be  no  reasonable 
charge that the  Community  is a  protectionist bloc.  The  E.E.C.  remains 
the biggest importer of agricultural imports  and  we  had  a  trade deficit 
in agriculture  in  1980  of nearly  29  billion dollars.  The  trade deficit 
of  the  E.E.C.  in agriculture with  the u.s.  increased in fact  from 
5.8 billion dollars  in  1979  to  6.8.  billion dollars  in  1980.  That  was 
an  increase of  17%,and  in the first nine months  of  1981  it continued 
to increase by  13%. 
Most  of  the  argument  between us  is not  about  imports  into 10 
the  E.C.  It is about exports  from  the E.E.C.  to third markets.  And 
here  there is a  basic difference of perception.  Your  authorities 
say agricultural subsidies are  bad  and must  be  removed.  We  say  that 
this is not what  the  international  trading rules provide.  The  agree-
ment  come  to after  long  and difficult negotiations  in the  Tokyo  Round 
in  1979  confirmed  and  elaborated  a  long  standing rule that agricultural 
subsidies are permitted providing that these did not  lead to any  Member 
of  the  GATT  obtaining more  than  an  equitable  share  of world  trade. 
How  has  this worked  out?  First we  are not the only  ones  who 
give  government  aid to our  farmers.  In our view if you  compare  like 
with like,  farm  spending  in the  E.E.C.  per  farmer  is not  far  off what 
it is in the  U.S. 
Having  said this,  what  has  happened  then to our  share of 
world  trade?  Let me  give  an  example.  There  have  been  complaints 
that  "subsidies  have  helped  to push  E.C.  wheat  exports  to  14  million 
tons,  double  their wheat  exports  three years  ago,  with  a  depressing 
effect on world prices".  Yes,  it is true that Community  exports 
doubled  between  1969-70  and  1980-81  to  14  million tons.  But world 
trade was  expanding  even more  rapidly.  Our  share  actually fell  from 
16.6%  to  14.9%  over  this period.  What  happened  to u.s.  exports? 
They  did not  just double.  They  more  than doubled.  They  rose  from 
16.5 million  tons  to  no  less  than  41.9 million tons  - from  38.4%  of 
world  trade to  no  less  than  44.8%  of  the  world market.  Indeed, 
thirteen years  ago  the  United States exported  40%  of  their production  -
now  this  amounts  to between  60  and  70%. 
Let me  put it another  way.  After  the  hard  fought  agreement 11 
we  reached in the  Tokyo  Round  about  "an equitable share of  the world 
market"  can  we  in Brussels  go  back to our  farmers  when  the world 
market  for  a  certain product is doubling  or trebling  and  say  to  them 
that they cannot  increase their exports  because  this might  inconvenience 
farmers  elsewhere? 
Let  us  talk not only about  the past.  For the  future  the 
E.E.C.  intends  to  continue  and  intensify its efforts to rationalize 
its agriculture.  Our  underlying  aim domestically is to put more  and 
more  responsibility on  farmers  themselves  to dispose of  surpluses1 
especially by  making  the  farmers  contribute to the cost of  surplus 
disposal.  Not  that we  consider  an  excess of domestic production over 
domestic  consumption  necessarily a  surplus  that must  be  eliminated. 
The  E.E.C.  intends  to keep its place  in world  trade.  But  we  consider 
that for  some  products  the European Community's  price guarantees  to 
its farmers  should  be  limited.  We  have  taken  steps  to this e.nd  for 
sugar  and  in part for milk products.  And  for  cereals  we  intend to 
fix  "production thresholds"  in terms  of quantity for.our  cereals for 
the  1980s.  This means  that if the  threshold is exceeded  then in the 
following  year,  the  level of  support will be  diminished.  All  this 
means  that farmers'  incomes1  which  have  fallen in real terms  in recent 
years,will be  further affected. 
And  we  can  also say,  not in any spirit of criticism,  that 
people  who  live in houses  with  large windows  should  be  careful about 
throwing  stones.  You  have  a  system of  support for dairy products 
which  limits imports  to  1%  of domestic  consumption,  and  you  have 
recently  imposed restrictions on  imports of  sugar. 12 
So  much  for  some  elements  of  the  record  and  some  guidelines 
for  the future. 
But where  in practice the  argument  is concentrating is 
on  subsidies  in general and particular disputes  in the  GATT.  A  state-
ment  of  u.s.  views  on  the Common  Agricultural Policy handed  to us 
and widely distributed to Congress  in February this year  said  "E.C. 
export subsidies are  the  single most  harmful of  E.C.  policies.  The 
U.S.  must  seek  an  acceptable plan and  timetable  for  their elimination". 
I  have  already set out what  we  agreed for agricultural subsidies  in 
the  Tokyo  Round.  This  U.S.  attitude goes  very  far  beyond it.  Nor 
does  this  seem  to square with  such  systems  as  DISC. 
Partl~ U.S.  policy is reflected in  a  whole  number  of  separate 
cases  brought for  adjudication to the  GATT  by  the United States  - wheat 
flour,  sugar,  poultry,  pasta,  canned fruit,  and citrus.  You  might 
say  why  not.  If there is adjudication in the  GATT  let it take its 
normal  course.  But  in the first place these cases  each require  lengthy 
and detailed debate.  In the  second place this concentration of  cases 
is not only unparalleled;  it risks blowing  the dispute  settlement 
process  in the  GATT  and  with it the rule of  law in wor.ld  trade  just as 
ce;rtainly as  overloading  with too  many  bulbs  an electric circuit. What  can  one  conclude  from  these  three  problem areas  ? 
It is difficult for  a  foreigner  to avoid  two  conclusions. 
The  first is that there  seems  to be  a  tendency to see 
the  cause  of  American difficulties originating abroad.  It is in 
the case of  U.S.  agriculture that this  tendency  seems  strongest 
to us.  The  deep  troubles of U.S.  agriculture can  be  ascribed to 
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a  variety of  causes:  interest rates,  growing  agricultural surpluses, 
a  strengthening dollar and  lower  prices  on  the  world markets.  But 
the  Community  cannot accept that its farmers  do  not  have  a  right 
to  make  a  living selling overseas  providing they abide  by 
international trading rules. 
A  second  conclusion is that the attitude  and  tone  of 
voice  in Washington  in foreign  trade policy  seems  a  good  deal 
more  extreme  than  anything  we  have  seen  for  a  long  time.  The  word 
"aggressive"  is frequently  used  in Administration  statements.  There 
seems  to be  a  feeling that previous u.s.  Administrations have  taken 
an  attitude of benevolent  liberalism,  that this has  not adequately 
safeguarded U.S.  interests  and  that  a  new  much  tougher  line with 
foreigners  needs  to be  adopted  to defend  American  interests.  I  may 
say  in passing that  I  find it difficult to recognize  this picture 
of  the past.  We  have  dealt over  the  last two  decades  with  a  number 
of  prominent  U.S.  officials in  economic  affairs.  John  Connolly, 
Mike  Blumenthal  and  Bob  Strauss  come  to mind.  And  anyone  who  thinks 
he  could make  a  quick dollar out of  these  men  believes  in unicorns. But  you will  say  why  should not  the  United States 
devote  itself to  a  singleminded  and  aggressive  pursuit of its 
own  interests internationally  ?  The  world  is not exactly full 
of  shrinking violets. 
I  would  suggest three  considerations which,  in American 
self-interest,  should  temper  this approach.  The  first  is that 
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the traditional picture of  an  America  so  rich,  so  powerful  and  so 
removed  from  the outside world  that it can easily afford this kind 
of policy has  been  overtaken  by  the  facts  of  life. 
For  roughly  a  century -- from  the Civil War  to  the  1960s 
foreign  trade  accounted  for  not  more  than  3-4  percent of United 
States  GNP.  In  the  1970s,  there  occurred  a  historical change.  In 
1980,  the  figure  was  9  percent.  More  strikingly,  exports  accounted 
for  about  one  fifth of  the  goods  produced  in the  United States. 
JYI.ore  than half of  U.S.  grain is exported.  Almost  one  of every three 
dollars of  U.S.  corporate profit derives  from  the  international 
trade  and  investment activities of  American  firms.  And  the pace 
of  U.S.  involvement with the rest of  the world  in fact  is quick-
ening.  According  to  a  recent Conference  Board  report,  four  out of 
every  five  manufacturing  jobs  created  in  the  United  States between 
1977  and  1980  were  linked to exports. 
And  this dependence  is especially true of  United States 
links with  Europe.  In  1980,  the United  States ran  a  surplus of 
25  billion dollars  in its trade with Europe  -- nearly  7  billion 
in agricultural goods.  So  this  shows  clearly enough  that escalating 15 
trade restrictions between  the  United States and  the rest of  the 
world  would  be  a  no  win  situation. 
The  second consideration is a  wider  one.  We  can well 
understand  as  Europeans  that an  increasing number  of  Americans 
look  today not  simply  to the  Eastern  seaboard  and  to  the  traditional 
links with  Europe,  but West  to  the Pacific.  The  fact nevertheless 
remains  that in international trade  the United  States  and  the 
European  Community  are  by  far  the biggest operators  on  the  world 
stage,  accounting  between  them  for  something  like  a  third of world 
trade -- nearly half if you  take  into account  trade  among  the 
countries  of  the  European  Community.  And  this means  that the  trading 
relationship between  Europe  and  the United  States is fundamental 
to  the  preservation of the  open  world  trading  system  on  which  the 
prosperity of  the West  has  depended  for  the  last 35  years.  It is 
in no  sense  to minimize  the  trading problems  elsewhere  in the world 
problems  with Japan,  the  fragile  financial  state of  a  number  of 
major  developing  countries -- to say that if the  shutters  come 
clanging  down  on  both  sides of  the Atlantic  then  the  open world 
trading  system is bust.  And  this is not  simply  a  commercial  fact. 
Not  simply  an  economic  fact.  It is a  political fact.  Some  of  you 
remember  the  days  of the bonus  marches,  of  soup  kitchens,  and 
"brother,  can  you  spare  a  dime  ?".  In  Europe  we  had  not  only  soup 
kitchens.  We  had  governments  that came  to power  by  torchlight in 
the night.  And  a  collapse of  the world  trading  system means  not 
only misery  and  hardship to an  extent not  seen  for  the  last fifty years,  but the  risk of  a  re-visitation of  the terrible ghosts 
of the  1930s. 
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There  is  a  tale about  the  development  of  the  atom  bomb 
in Los  Alamos  in the early  1940s.  The  search was  then  on  for what 
was  called the critical mass  -- the weight  of  two  uranium halves 
which  propelled together  could start a  nuclear explosion.  One 
physicist experimented  for  months  moving  them  together with  a 
screwdriver.  One  day,  the  screwdriver  slipped.  An  eerie blue  light 
filled the whole  laboratory.  Only  half  a  second  stood  between  the 
disappearance  of  Los  Alamos  and  possibly  a  change  in world history. 
The  laboratory was  saved.  The  physic~t died.  He  had  a  phrase  for 
what  he  had  been  doing.  He  called it "twisting the tail of the 
dragon".  I  sometimes  have  the  feeling  that this is what  we  are 
doing  in  the trade  field.  I  lived through  the years  in the  1930s 
as  a  schoolboy  and  the early  1940s  as  a  young  soldier when  the 
dragons  had  been  wakened.  I  do  not want  to  see  the  dragons  wakened 
again.  So,  twisting their tail seems  to  me  a  high risk occupation. 
And  there is,  I  would  suggest,  a  third  consideration. 
It is no  bad  thing  from  time  to  time  to  stand back  and  look at 
what history will be  saying  about  us  in  20  years  time.  And  history 
will  surely regard  these quarrels  we  are  having  across  the Atlantic 
as  something difficult to understand.  A  lot of attention is being 
devoted here  to the dangers  which  the Soviet Union  represents  for 
the  free  world.  Yet,  here  is the Soviet  empire  going  through its worst  and  most  ramshackle  moments  since  the October  Revolution. 
Unrest  and  shortages  in  some  Eastern bloc countries,  a  fourth 
failure  in  a  row  of  the  Soviet grain crop.  And  yet,  this is the 
moment  we  -- on  both  sides of  the Atlantic -- have  chosen  to 
attack each other.  Does  not  a  divided West  risk great dangers  ? 
The  nations  who  bore  arms  a  generation  ago  in defence of liberty 
and  who  stand ready  to do  so  again  need  each other  far  more  than 
they  need  to quarrel. 
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So  all this is an  argument  not  for  sweeping  our differences 
under  the carpet but  for  seeing  sometimes  by  open discussion,  some-
times  by discreet bilateral exploration what  accommodation  we  can 
find.  If not,  history will  judge  us  harshly.  And  history will be 
right. 
Mr.  ~sador. Part of  a  diplomat's  job is to listen and 
I  shall be  doing  a  lot of  that over  the next  few  months  and  years. 
But it is also  a  diplomat's  job to tell the tale as  he  and  his 
clients see it.  So  I  should like to  thank  you  for  your  courtesy 
in listening to me  today  and  to say  that  I  look  forward  very  much 
to my  stay in  a  fascinating city and  a  great country. 